ENGLISH CASES ON THE RESTRAINT OF LIBEL
BY INJUNCTION SINCE THE SUPREME
COURT JUDICATURE ACT, 1873.
In 1854 the Parliament of Great Britain passed an act,
known as the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, for enlarging the jurisdiction of the courts of common law.'
This act enabled anyone who sued for the breach of a contract or other injury to claim a "writ of injunction against
the repetition or continuance of such breach of. contract or
other injury." 2 It also enabled the plaintiff in any such
action to apply ex parte for an injunction to restrain the
repetition of the act complained of, either before or after
judgment, and provided that the court had a right to issue
such injunction on such terms as appeared "reasonable and
just.' 3 This statute appears to give jurisdiction to the
common law courts to issue a permanent or interlocutory
injunction to restrain a tort, where an action -for damages
for such tort has beerl instituted, the permanent injunction
to be given only after'judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
As far as the writer is aware no case involving an application to a court of common law for the restraint of a libel
arose subsequent to the passage of this act, and before the
Judicature Act of I873.4 This last act created a Supreme
Court, with two permanent divisions, the High Court of
Justice. and the Court of Appeals,5 and vested in the High
Court of Justice the jurisdiction which, prior to the act, had
existed in many courts of original jurisdiction, among
others the courts of common law at Westminster, and the
High Court of Chancery.' The jurisdiction to issue injunctions to restrain tort which had been vested in the courts of
common law by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, and
the jurisdiction of Chancery over the same subject was thus
vested in the High Court of Justice. Furthermore the
Judicature Act expressly gives the court power to grant an
injunction "by an interlocutory order in all cases in which
'Stats. at Large, 17 and z8 Vict., Ch. 12s. 2Section 79. 1 Section 82.
'L. R., Stats. 1873, 36 and 37 Vict., (Ch.66. 3 Section s. • Section 6.
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it shall appear to the court to be just or convenient that
such an order should. be made; and any such order may be
made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court shall think just."?* It will be noticed
that this clause speaks only of interlocutory injunctions.
The object of this paper is to ascertain how *farunder the
acts mentioned the English High Court of Justice has the
right to restrain by injunction the publication of a libel,
and if the court has this power, what are the principles, if
any, which guide the court in exercising the jurisdiction?
The first libel case to arise after the passage of the Judicature Act was Thorley's Cattle Food Company v. Massam.8
This was an application before Vice-Chancellor Malins for
an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing a statement to the effect that the defendant was alone
possessed of the secret of compounding a certain well-known
cattle food. As the vice-chancellor had just decided that
the plaintiffs also were possessed of the secret,9 there was no
doubt in his mind that the statement sought to be restrained
was false. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that if, prior
to the Judicature Act he could not have obtained the injunction, the twenty-fifth section of that act had given power
to the court to issue the injunction in all cases where it was
"just and convenient."' 1 The vice-chancellor was inclined
to think, that upon the proper construction of the section,
whenever the court sees that an injunction ought to be
granted, it may be granted. 1' As he believed the injunction
in the case before him, in view of a recent decision, should
not be granted except for the Judicature Act, he regarded
the question of whether it can now be granted in view of
that act as of too great importance to be decided on an interlocutory application. 12 It will be noticed that by refusing
to decide the matter on interlocutory motion he impliedly
Section 2S, Clause 8. I L. R. 6 Ch. D. 582, 1877.
Ilassam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Company. 6 Ch. D. S74, 877.
10 Page 585. "1Page 59o.
is The recent case to which he referred was Prudental Assurance
Company v. Knott, L. R. io Ch. 142. 1875, in which his own opinion
in Dixon v. Holden, '4L. R. 7 Eq. 488, 1869, that a libelous writing
7

'See

injurious to property can be restrained was severely criticised.

324

RESTRAINT OF LIBEL BY INJUNCTION.

takes the position that the twenty-fifth section of the Judicature Act may be considered as applying to final as well
as interlocutory injunctions. He also intimates in the opinion referred to, his belief that the twenty-fifth section
of the Judicature Act has indefinitely extended the-power of
the court to restrain wrong conduct by injunction. It will
also be noticed that he in nowise refers to the Common
Law Procedure Act, 1854, as increasing his power to issue
the injunction asked for.1'
In Beddow v. Beddow.14 Sir George Jessel discussed the
relation between the act, 1854, and the Judicature Act. It
was not a case involving the restraint of libel. It was a
motion for an injunction to restrain the defendant from
acting as a referee or arbitrator under the provisions of an
agreement. Counsel for the defendant contended that a
court of chancery had no power to remove an arbitrator because he was indebted to one of the parties. The master of
the rolls impliedly admitted this; but he maintained his
jurisdiction. He first pointed out that the Act of x854 conferred on the common law courts, in cases where actions
had been brought at law, a much wider power to issue injunctions than that assumed by the Court of Chancery. The
latter was limited by the practice of different chancellois, but
by the Act of 1854 the only limit spoken of in the eightieth
section, the section which confers the right to issue interim
injunctions, is that the injunction shall appear to the court
to be reasonable and just. This wider jurisdiction has
been conferred by the Judicature Act on the High Court of
Justice. He seenis to imply-indeed it is a necessary inference-that had it not been for the twenty-fifth section of the
Judicature Act, this wider power would have been confined
as it was in the Common Law Procedure Act, to cases in
which an action for damages had been instituted, and he
shows that the twenty-fifth section of the act extends
the power to all cases where -an injunction is just or convenient, and that these words in the Judicature Act are
rendered clear by a reference to the Act of 1854. He further
1SFor

the ultimate disposition of the controversy between the two

rival cattle food companies see infra, note 20.
11 L. R. 9 Ch. D. 89, z878.
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points out, that though the twenty-fifth section speaks only
of interlocutory orders, it is a necessary implication that
what can be done on an interlocutory application can be
done in the trial of the action. He concludes with this
sweeping declaration: "In my opiniori, having regard to
these two acts of Parliament, I have unlimited power to
grant an injunction in any case where it would be right or
just to do so."' 15 He, however, adds these significant words:
" . .what is just or right must be decided, not by the
caprice of the judge, but according to sufficient legal reasons
or on settled legal principles."1 6
Sir George Jessel ini the case just discussed had claimed a
wide extension of the powers of the court to issue injunctions as a result of the Judicature Act. In the same year, in
Saxby v. Easterbrook,"7 Chief Justice Coleridge and Lindley, J., maintained a doctrine which, irrespective of the Judicature Act gave to the court a power, not heretofore claimed,
except by Vice-Chancellor Malins, to restrain, under certain
circumstances, the publication of a libel. The plaintiff had
brought an action for damages for the publication by the
defendant of the statement that the plaintiff was not the
first inventor of a certain patent. At the trial before Lord
Coleridge the jury adjudged the publication libellous, and
the judge then issued a permanent injunction restraining
the defendant from publishing similar libels against the
plaintiff. A doubt having arisen as to the power of a judge
at nisi prius to order an injunction, the motion for the injunction was renewed and heard by a divisional court, which
after argument confirmed the order. Both judges regarded
the question before them as identical with that which would
have arisen, if, prior to the Judicature Act, an application
had been made to Chancery to restrain a publication injuriIs Page 93.

In the case before him he granted the injunction.
14 It is of course improper to issue the injunction where the defendant
is not violating any legal right of the plaintiff. See Day v. Brownrigg,
L. R. xo Ch. D. 294, x878, 307. where the court refused to restrain the
defendant from adopting for his country place the same name as that
used for many years by the plaintiff, his neighbor, to designate his
place. The court believed the defendant had a right to call his place
by any name he wanted to.
L. R. 3 C. P. D. 339, 1878.
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ous to the plaintiff's business and which had been determined by a jury to have been libellous. The reason for
regarding the question before them in this light is not stated.
They must have considered that the Common Law Procedure Act conferred on the Common Law Courts;-only
the then existing jurisdiction of equity- over torts,
where an action for the tort had been brought, and
therefore that the Judicature Act, in conferring on the
High Court of Justice the jurisdiction of the Common Law
Courts, did not confer any greater equitable jurisdiction
over torts than was conferred by vesting in the court the
existing jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery.
From this point of view the judicature Act merely
enabled the remedy by injunction and by damages
to be obtained in a single action. It will be noted that this
conclusion as to the extent of the power to issue injunctions
conferred by the Common Law Procedure Act is directly
contrary to that of Sir George Jessel. Lord Coleridge also
states that he does not see what the twenty-fifth section of
the Judicature Act has to do with the question; thus making
the assumption that this section only confers power to issue
interim injunctions, an assumption which is again in opposition to the opinion of the Master of the Rolls. s
Regarding the question before them, as whether, irrespective of any statute, a court of equity has jurisdiction to
restrain a writing which a jury has declared to be libellous,
they take the position, that the reason why the court of
equity ordinarily refuses to restrain the publication of a
writing, is because since Fox's Act the question of libel or
no libel is peculiarly one for the jury, but where a jury has
determined this question, there is no reason why an injunction should not issue. They admit that no cases in equity
have gone so far; but they also point out that in all the
IsLord Coleridge had no doubt but that the 2 5 th section of the
Judicature Act greatly extended the power of the court to issue
injunctions on interlocutory application. See his opinion the following
year in Shaw v. Earl of 7ersey, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 120, 1879, 123, 124,
where he restrained a landlord from distraining on his tenant, the
tenant having asserted that the right of distress was unjustly
claimed, though the Judge admitted that he would have had on power
to do so except under this section of the Act.
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cases in equity in which the injunction had been refused,
the' application had been made before the nature of the
writing sought to be restrained had been determined by a
jury. The weakness of this argument from an historical
point of view is that Fox's Act applies only to criminal
libels,1 9 and that prior to the passage of this act the Court
of Equity did not restrain the publication of writings. This
would indicate that the origin of the reluctance of the
chancellors to restrain libels was in the feeling of the public
in regard to the liberty of the press, and that the desire to
have the question of libel or no libel in criminal cases determined by a jury, was merely another effect of this feeling.
The idea of Lord Coleridge and Mr. Justice Lindley, that
any court of equity has the right to restrain a libel after the
same has been passed on by a jury, seems to have met the
approval of at least two other Judges. Vice-Chancellor
Malins, when the case of Thorley's Cattle Food. Company v. Massam came before him for final disposition,"G for the purpose "of bringing the case within the
decisions" assessed the damages as a jury at forty shillings
and then granted a permanent injunction against a republication of the statement of which the plaintiff complained.2"
The Court of Appeal confirmed this injunction.2 2 Sir
Edward Fry refers to the principle stated in Saxby v. Easferbrook, in Thomas v. Williams,28 with apparent approval."
He also, however, takes the position that the Judicature Act
19

37 Stats. at Large, Ch. 6o, 32 Geo. rt.
21 Page 78!.

20 L. R. 14 Ch. D. 763, z88o.

32James, L. J., Baggallay, L. J.. and Bramwell, L. J., were the
members of the court. There is no discussion as to the origin of the
jurisdiction to issue a permanent injunction. The counsel for the
defendant argued that the question of libel had not been tried by
jury as required bySaxby v. Easterbrook. The members of the court
do not discuss this argument. It would appear that at this time the
defendant had a right before the case was tried to demand a jury
trial; see Judicature Act, 1873, Sch. 3!, and Judicature Act, 187S,
Order xxxvi, Sec. 3. The absolute right to a jury trial seems to have
existed until 1883, when by the Rules of the Supreme Court of that
year, made under Sections x6, 17 of the Judicature Act, 5875, giving
the court power to alter the rules in the schedule of the act, actions
begun in the Chancery Division may be tried- by jury if the judge so
2a L. R. r4 Ch. D. 864. i88o. 874.
dsrects.
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was intended to enlarge the power of the court in respect to
injunctions.24 In the case before him, the injunction would
have been issued irrespective of any question arising under
the act, or of the jurisdiction of equity to restrain libels, as
the writing restrained falsely represented the goods of the
defendent as the goods of the plaintiff.
As far as the writer is aware, in only two other cases
have the English -courts issued permanent injunctions to
restrain libels and in neither are the grounds of the
jurisdiction discussed. In Hill v. Davies,2 5 Kay, J.,
issued an injunction to restrain the defendant from
issuing a circular to persons not members of the Friendly
Society of which the plaintiffs were trustees, reflecting on
the financial standing of the society, "or any other circular
or letter containing false or inaccurate representation, as to
the credit or the financial condition of the said society." The
judge believed the statements heretofore made to be untrue
in fact. The words quoted were added to the order
by the court. Their propriety -may be considered more
than doubtful. To restrain a man from repeating a statement found on investigation to be libellous is one thing;
but to prohibit a man generally from making false statements about another is a most indefinite variety of blanket
order. 26 In the comparatively recent case of Pink v. Federation of Tradcs and Labour Unions, 27 the court continued at
the trial and made perpetual an injunction previously
granted on interlocutory application to restrain the defendant from publishing a statement to the effect that the plaintiff had persistently boycotted five lightermen for belonging to a union, a statement which the court not only thought
faise, but injurious to the plaintiff.
It would thus seem to be beyond question that the English
courts have power to issue an injunction to restrain a writirg which after trial has been ascertained to be libellous,
and that they will freely exercise the right. It would seem
also immaterial whether the action was begun in the Chancery or in the Common Pleas Division of the High Court of
",Page 873. "6L. R. 2z Ch. D. 798, 1882.
24 The order will be found on page 802.
37 67 L. T. Rep.. n. S. 258, 1890.
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Justice, as two of the cases above cited were begun in the
Chancery Division. Under the present rules making a
jury trial, where the action has been begun in the Chancery Division, optional with the judge,2 8 it is not necessary that the question of libel or no libel shall
have been determined by a jury, or that the defendant shall
have had a right to a jury trial. It may be that the profession in England agree with the late Lord Coleridge and with
Lord Lindley, that any court having equity powers has the
right to restrain a libel after verdict; but the United- States,
not England, is the country where this question has any live
interest. For in England, the cases which we are about to
discuss on interlocutory injunctions to restrain libel, have,
as we shall see, confirmed the opinion of Sir George Jessel,
that the Judicature Act gives the High Court of Justice a
power to issue injunctions only limited by such rules as the
courts themselves see fit to set.
These cases on interim injunctions to restrain libels begin
with the case of the Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining
Company v. Beall.2 1 A solicitor, acting for some- of the
shareholders of a company, sent out to the other shareholders a circular reflecting on the way in which the company was conducted. An action was commenced by the
company and an interlocutory injunction applied for. which
was granted by .Vice-Chancellor Bacon. The Court of
Appeal per Jessel, Baggallay and Lindley, L. JJ., discharged the injunction. They did so, however, not because
they doubted the power of the court to restrain a libel on
interlocutory application, but because they did not believe
that this was a proper case for the exercise of the -power.
Sir George Jessel repeats his position on the question of
jurisdiction taken in Beddow v. Beddow. 0 His point of view
is adopted by Sir Richard Baggallay, who also expressly
points out that the Common Law Procedure Act gave much
wider power to issue injunctions than the customary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.31 As far as the writer is
2 See Note

22

supra. 20 L. R. 20Cli. D cot,

z882.

" See supra, note 14.
81 Lindley. L. J.. contents himself in supporting the jurisdiction by
a reference to Thomas v. Williams, and Beddow v. Beddow.
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aware, since this decision no one has questioned the power
of the court under the Judiciary Act to grant an interim
injunction to restrain a libel. The power has been repeatedly
asserted.3 2
But it is one thing to have the power, another to exercise
it. In Quarts Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Company v.
Beall, as we have seen, the Court of Appeal declared that
the facts did not warrant an interlocutory injunction. By
pointing out three objections to the injunction the Master
of the Rolls indicated that there were at least three requisites
for such an injunction. He said that it was not shown that
the alleged libel was untrue, or that the defendant intended
to repeat the publication; but that, more important than all,
the publication on its face was of the nature of a privileged
communication issued by one shareholder to his brother
3 on the other hand, an
shareholders. In Loog v. Bean,"
injunction granted on interlocutory application was confirmed in the Court of Appeal. The case was one of slander,
not libel, but as the court points out the same principles in
regard to injunctions to restrain apply. The defendant,
who had been employed in the sale of sewing machines, was
dismissed by the plaintiffs. He then began to go to the
persons .to whom he had sold machines for the plaintiffs and
make slanderous statements about them. To one he declared
that the machine sold was worthless; another he warned
not to pay the plaintiffs, as they had cheated him; to a
third he stated that the plaintiffs were insolvent. The court
believed that these stitements were untrue, malicious and
injurious to the plaintiffs. It may also be pointed out that
there could not have been any doubt in regard to the slanderous character of the statements themselves, admitting that
they were untrue. The case unquestionably satisfies all the
requisites for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a libel
32 Armstrong v. ArMit, 2 Times L. R. 887, z886; Coulson v. Coudson,
* Times L. R. 846, 1887; Liverpool Household Stores Asso. v. Smith,
L. R. 37 Ch. D. 170. x887, 175, 183; Bonnard v. Perryman (x89z), 2
Ch. 269, 275. 283, 285; Collard v. Marshall (1892), x Ch. 571, 577;
Pink v. Federation(if Trades and LabJour Unions, 67 L. T., n. s. aS8,
1892, 259; 'lonson v. Tussauds (1894), i Q. B. 671, 689, 692.
"L. R. 26 Ch. D. 36, 1884.
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;s suggested by Sir George Jessel in Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Company v. Beall.
The cases of Armstrong v. Armit3 4 and Coulson v. Coulson,3 5 besides suggesting additional circumstances which
must be present before an alleged libel will be restrained on
interlocutory motion, illustrate the strong reluctance of the
court to grant such injunctions. In the former case, which
came before the court on a motion to restrain the defendants from publishing a statement that the plaintiffs had obtained government contracts by means of corrupt influences,
Lord Coleridge, in his opinion advocating that the motion
should be dismissed, lays emphasis on the fact that the
plaintiffs had not shown that the continued publication of
the statement would do them irreparable damage.3 6 In
Coulson v. Coulson, the Court of Appeal dismissed the
interim injunction granted by the court below because they
felt they were not in possession of sufficient facts. Lord
Esher, in the course of his opinion, stated certain criteria
for the issuing of these injunctions. His statements have
had considerable influence on the practice of the English
courts. Referring to the fact, that, though Fox's Act had
reference only to criminal cases, since its passage it had
always been considered that the question of libel or no libel
was for the jury, he says: "To justify the court in granting
an interim injunction, it must come to a decision upon the
question of libel or no libel, before the jury decided whether
it was a libel or not. Therefore the jurisdiction was of a
delicate nature. It ought only to be exercised in the clearest
cases, where any jury would say that the matter complained
of was libellous, and where if the jury did not so find, the
court would set aside the verdict as unreasonable. The
court must also be satisfied that the alleged libel is untrue,
that there was malice
and if written on a privileged occasion
37
on the part of the defendant.

No one will care to question his own conclusion that, "It
followed from these rules that the court could only on
3 2

Times L. R. 887,

886.

' 3 Times L. R. 846.

887.

89o. Denman. J., concurred. The motion was dismissed.
A A cision of the Queen's Bench Division. Lord Coleridge also thought
2, Page

that the statement was probably privileged.

37Page 846.
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the rarest occasions exercise their jurisdiction." The ideas
of Lord Esher were followed in Liverpool Household Stores
Association v. Smith,3s where the Chancery Division and
the Court of Appeal refused to restrain the defendant on
interlocutory motion from publishing any letters reflecting
on the financial standing of the plaintiff association, though
the assertions were probably untrue. The test in Coulson v.
Coulson was referred to, and it was pertinently asked, "...
how can the court judge whether documents, which are not
yet in existence, will be libellous ?"3 9 If the court will not

issue the injunction, unless on reading the statement desired to be restrained they have no doubt of its libellous
character, it necessarily follows that they will not restrain
a non-existing document.40 . The case of Bonnard v. Perry-

man41 introduces a further limitation.

The defendant

was the publisher of a weekly financial newspaper.

The

plaintiffs traded as the Mercantile and General Trust. The
defendant published a violent attack on the plaintiffs,
reflecting on their financial standing and their integrity,
among other things speaking of their place of business as a

"Jew's den," asserting that they had bought the furniture of
their offices with borrowed money, and that they associated
with one Marks, a person elsewhere described by the defendant as guilty of all the crimes in the criminal code. In the
Chancery Division an interim injunction was issued by
is 37 Ch. D.

170.

1887.

,Per Cotton. L. T., p. 18x.

o Kekewich. J., who refused the injunction in this case in the
Chancery Division. nevertheless expressed a rule in regard to issuing
these injunctions, somewhat more liberal than that pointed out by
Lord Esher ir Coulson v. Coulion. After asserting the jurisdiction to
restrain a libel on interlocutory motion, he says that the general rule
in regard to these interim injunctions is that they should be issued
whenever "the Court sees that there is a fair question to be tried,
and that there will be irreparable injury unless the injunction issue."
He points out that the only difference in the case of alleged libel,
and injunctions in other cases, is that to issue the injunction the
court must decide the question of the character of the publication.
and that they ought to be cautious in doing so "lest it should influence the minds of the jury." He h;mself doubts the correctness of
the assumption that the jury will be influenced; but still regards
the assumption as the basis for the court's reluctance to issue interim
injunctions in cases of libel. See page 175. 41 (x8o) 2 Ch. 269.
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North, J. He regarded the case as coming within all the
requisites for such an injunction; namely, that the statements were false, sure to be repeated by the defendant unless
be was restrained, and not of a privileged character. That if
untrue they were libellous was beyond question. The Court
of Appeal, however, dissolved the injunction. 2 Lord Coleridge reiterates the principles stated in Coulson v. Coulson,
but he adds an additional requisite. He says: "In the particular case before us. indeed, the libellous character of the
publication is beyond dispute, but the effect of it upon *the.
defendant can be finally disposed of only by a jury, and
we cannot feel sure that the defence of justification is one
which, on the facts which may be before them. the jury may
find to be wholly unfounded; nor can we tell what may be
the damages recoverable. Moreover. the decision at the
hearing may turn upon the question of the general character
of the plaintiffs; and this is a point which can rarely be
investigated satisfactorily upon affidavit before trial . . "'s
The last sentence just ouoted would seem to indicate that in
his opinion the statement sought to be restrained contained
general allegations concerning character. Tbough there is
no other decision raising the question whether general statements. of bad character will be re.strained on interlocutory
motion, it may be taken for granted that in such cases the
court will not issue an interim injunction. The first part of
the quotation, however, raises other and more doubtful questions. It may be that' Lord Coleridge thought that the
facts before him indicated that it was doubtful whether the
assertions sought to be restrained were untrue. In that case
in refusing the injunction he introduces no new principle,
but if he merely believed that the defendant would introduce
evidence to show the truth of his statements and on that
account refused the injunction, then the sentence above
quoted stands for the proposition: That in cases involving
character libels. whenever the court believes the jury will
be called upon to consider evidence to show that the libel
was justified, an interim injunction should not issue.
Again, when he says. "nor can we tell what may be the
4 Per Coleridge, C.J., Lord Esher. M.R., Lindley, L. J., and Bowen,
L. J.

Kay, L. J., dissented.

42Page 284.
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damages recoverable," he may merely mean that in the case
before him the evidence showed that the defendant would
probably be able to prove that the general character of the
plaintiffs was so bad that even if they had been libelled they
were not injured ;but it looks as though he intended to assert
the principle, that whenever the court believed that the question of the general character of the plaintiff would come
before the jury in mitigation of damages an interim injunction should not issue. It will readily be seen. that these
two propositions practically take away all power to issue
interim injunctions to restrain a libel affecting character,
except where the defendant rests his whole case on the
contention that the publication is not libellous because
it does not impute evil, and the court is clearly of the opinion
that it does impute evil and is libellous.
Whether the opinion of Lord Coleridge, as interpreted by"
the two propositions above given, is or is not shared by the
present English judges, they would appear to have nothingto do with trade libels, that is statements in respect to a
person's goods. We may also presume that those who agree
with Bonnard v. Perryman, do not object to an interim
injunction restraining a statement which injures the person
attacked in the minds of particular persons with whom he
deals, and consequently affects his sales among that class,
but does not injure him in eyes of the average member of
the community, and therefore strictly speaking, does not
Ve have already mentioned a case
affect his character.
belonging to this last class. In Pink v. Federationof Trades
and Labour Unions,4 4 Kekewich, J., issued an interim injunction to restrain the publication by the defendant of a
statement that the plaintiff had persistently boycotted five
workmen for belonging to a union.4 5 The statement.was be-

ing mailed to the secretaries of co-operative societies, the
plaintiff having considerable trade-among the members of
such societies. A case more nearly like Bonnard v. Perryman is Collard v. Marshall. 6 Here Chitty, J., issued an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from further pub" 67 L. T., n. s. 258,1 892.
46The case is reported on motion for a permanent injunction, see
" (1892) x Ch. 57.
supra, note 27.
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lishing a circular to the effect that the sweating system was
practiced at the plaintiff's works. He distinguished the case
from Bonnard v. Perryinan on tht ground that the former
was a libel affecting general character and the case before
him was a trade libel. The distinction between the cases may
be doubted. If by trade libel is meant a libel intended to
affect and affecting a man's business, then both cases were
cases of trade libels. If by trade libel is meant a statement
concerning the plaintiff's goods, then neither case is a case
of trade libel. To call a man as in Bonnard v. Perryinan an
associate of blacklegs, is a statement calculated to injure his
standing in the community; but to say that he uses the
sweating system, probably does the same thing; though it is
true that a particular class of persons, that is laborers, are
particularly affected by such statements. The difference between the two cases is one of degree rather than of kind,
and as Bonnard v. Pcrrynan is a decision by the Court of
Appeal, Collard v. Marshall must be regarded as a doubtful
case.
The last and in one sense the principal case to discuss
these interim injunctions in cases of libel is -Monson v.
Tussauds. 47 The plaintiff had been indicted in Scotland for
murder. The trial attracted a great deal of attention, and resulted in the Scotch verdict of "not proven." -Thedefendants
were the proprietors of an exhibition consisting of wax figures
representing famous and infamous persons. They exhibited
a wax image of the plaintiff, and in another part of their
establishment known as the "Chamber of Horrors," a representation of the scene of the murder; though no representation of the plaintiff appeared.
An interim injunction
to restrain the exhibit was issued by a Divisional Court.
Mathews, J., adopts the principle of Coulson v. Coulson,.
and favors the injunction because he believes that the representation is unquestionably libellous. 48 Collins, J., however, repeats the principle of Lord Coleridge, that it must
be apparent that the defendant will not justify his act at
the trial. He, therefore, only favors the interim injunction
because the defendants disavow any intention to justify
" (1894) r Q. B. 671.
"Page 676.
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the libel and place their whole case on the assertion that
what they have done is not libellous, because the plaintiff is
not represented as the murderer. 49
Between the issuance of the interim injunction by the
Divisional Court, and the hearing of the appeal on the
interlocutory order, the defendants filed affidavits to the
effect that the plaintiff had consented to the representation.
The appeal was allowed and the injunction dissolved, The
judgment was unanimous, but the members of the court
differed as to the grounds of their action. Lord Halsbury
would have affirmed the action of the court below had it
not been for the additional affidavits. He distinctly repudiates the idea that the injunction should not issue in these
cases, unless there is no question for the jury to decide.8 0
He admits that the injunction should not issue except in a
clear case, but he apparently objects to the rule that tfie
existence of a libel must be so clear that any judge would
be justified in setting aside a contrary verdict. 51 The other
two judges, on the contrary, uphold Lord Esher's rule,
that there must be no shadow of question as to the libellous
nature of the publication. 2
In view of the differences of opinion in the case just discussed, Kekewich, J., in Throllope v. The London Building
Trades Federation's said, speaking of the plaintiff's contention, that a publication was a libel and should be restrained: "In my opinion it is convenient, if possible, not to
dealwith anyquestion of that kindupon interlocutorymotion,
having regard to the authorities, and more especially to the
recent case of Monson v. Tussauds." This attitude, however. is hardly fair to the cases. The cases do enable us to
come to certain definite conclusions. In the first place there is
no doubt that tinder the Judicature Act the Jurisdiction exists.
Again. in cases where the injury comes from the way in
which the wares of the plaintiff are spoken of, the injunc"Page 68o. ,0Page 689. 51Page 685.
" Pages 6o4. 6o6. 697.
They seem to differ, however, as to the
appliration of tl-e rule to the ease on the facts presented to the Divisional Court. Lones, J.. believes that it is not clear that the representation was libelous: while Davey. J., does not distinctly cormmit
himself on this point. See pages 694, 697.
3*72 L. T. Rep. 342. 180C. 343.-
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tion will issue, provided the statement is believed by the
judge to be untrue and calculated to do irreparable harm to
the plaintiff. So also the injunction will issue where the
effect of the statement which the judge believes to oe untrue
is to affect tne sale of the plaintiff's waies, not by injuring
his character, but by affecting the prejudices of his customers. It is only in the case of libels affecting character
that any doubt should exist in regard to the principles on
which the court will act. Even here we find certain rules
which we may regard as certain. Statements involving a
person's general character will not be restrained. Where,
however, the defendant places his whole case on the proposition that the publication is not libellous because it imputes.
no wrong to the plaintiff, and the court is clearly of a contrary opinion, an interim injunction will issue. The only
question of doubt is whether a character libel will ever be
restrained where the defendant intends to justify his assertions on the trial. This was doubtful before Tussaud's
case and is doubtful yet, with the decided preponderance of
jtdicial opinion against issuing the interim injunction in
such a case."
In conclusion, it may properly be asked: Has the experience of England, under the statutes giving jurisdiction to
restrain a libel by injunction, been such as to encourage our
legislatures to confer on our courts similar powers? The
writer believes that this question can without question be
answered in the affirmative, at least as far as the power to restrain the repetition of a publication found by a jury to be
libellous. The English courts are of the opinion, as we
have seen, that an act of the legislature is not necessary to
enable a court having equity powers to issue such an
injunction. Whether this be so or not, there is no apparent
reason why the liberty to speak and write freely should give
a person license to continually publish matter which a jury
54 The fact tnat a single judge has questioned Lord Esher's view

that the publication to be restraincd on interim injunction should be.
so clearly libelous that any judge would set aside" a verdict to the
contrary as unreasonable, can hardly be said to throw any doubt on
a proposition that has been so frequently reiterated, and which was
rviterated by the majority in the very case in which Lord Chancellor
Ilalsbury dissented from it.
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has declared to be libellous. Where the action is begun not
for damages. but for an injunction, the act should not confer jurisdiction on the court of equity to issue a permanent
injunction unless the defendant has the right to have the
question of libel determined by a jury. The fact that under
the English act, and orders, the judge has the right to send
such a case to a jury, but is under no obligation to do so,
is a defect. There is unquestionably an element of danger to
free criticism in permitting a judge to determine the existence of a libel, and having so determined, issue a permanent
injunction to restrain it. The jurisdiction to restrain a publication alleged to be libellous by an interim injunction is
one, which in the hands of an ill-trained judiciary would be
liable to gross abuse. Under the decisions we have discussed, which practically confine the exercise of the jurisdiction to the restraint of libels which have nothing to do
with character, the jurisdiction has much to commend it.
In fact the way in which the English courts are hammering
out from individual instances the principles which should
guide them in exercising the right to restrain libels, on interlocutory motion, is a vindication of the assertion, that it is
no argument against a jurisdiction, which in some cases can
be exercised beneficially, to say that it might be used so as
to unduly interfere with personal liberty. 55

William DraperLewis.
SIf have purposely omitted any discussion of the case of Throllope v.

The London Budding TradesFedcratiwn, 72 L. T. Rep. 342, 1895, 343
because, though an interim injunction was there issued to restrain
a publication, the publication was not libelous, -and Kekewich, I.,
who issued the iniunction, distinctly stated that he did not issue the
injunction under any jurisdiction to restrain a libel.

The case itself,

though scantily considered in the Court of Appeal, suggests questions
of considerable interest.

A strike had been declared by the union

at the plaintiff's works. Some of the plaintiff's men had remained
at work. The defendants published a poster with a black edge,
headed "Throppe's Black List," containing the names of the nonunion workmen in the employ of the firm. The designation "Black

List" meant a list of men who were not in sympathy with acts of
the union.

There was no allegation .that the inference to be drawn

from the words was untrue. The writing therefore was not libelous.
Kekewich, J., issued the injunction on the ground that the publication
was a purely malicious act, having for its ultimate object the injury
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of the plaintiff. lie intimates that had it been for the benefit of the
members of the union it might have been lawful. This idea makes
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the publication depend on the
motive of the defendants, a theory repudiated by the House of Lords
in Allen v. Flood (j898), A. C. x. To the writer there appears to be
two ways in which a publication can injure another. The publication
may injure because it produces in the minds of those who read it the
idea that the person spoken of is not in some respect or other a proper
person. The injury due to libel is an injury of this character. But
to make a person who has published a statement derogatory to the
character of another civilly liable for the injury he has done, it is
necessary that the statement in the publication should be untrue.
Where a written statement injures a person solely because it lowers
the estimation in which he is held. to recover for the injury the injured
person must bring his case within the principles of civil liability for
libel.
The second way in which a publication may injure another is by
inducing in the reader or readers a course of action inimical to the
person spoken of. For instance. B in a letter to C may urge C not to
deal with A, though nothing in any way affecting A's character may
be said. If C in consequence refused to deal with A, A would be
injured by the letter, though of course B would not be liable for this
injury. B may induce C to break his contract with A either by
argument or by threats of business or physical harm, and again the
vehicle of the argument or the threat may be a publication. How
far B is liable to A for the harm done in this class of casis is a subject
which as far as the English cases are concerned we have treated at
length in the March number of this magazine (see supra. p. 125)
It will b:e seen that this question has nothing to do with libel. Lastly,
B may induce C to assault A, and here also the vehicle of communication may be a letter or a printed publication. In this last case there
would of course be no doubt of the liability of B. Now, where the
injury from the publication falls-under the first class, the libel class,
outside of a statute conferring jurisdiction, the courts of equity have
not restrained the publication, at least until the existence of the
libelous character of the publication has been determined by a jury;
but where the injury from the publication falls under the second class
there is no reason why a court of equity should not restrain the publication when if published an injury would result for which there would
be an action at law. There are several English and American cases
in which such injunctions have been issued. These the writer hopes
to discuss at a subsequent time. He now merely suggests that the
case of Throllope v. The London Busldng Trades may be supported as
belonging to this second class. It has recently becn decided by the
House of Lords in Quinn v. Leathem (igoi), A. C. 495, that a combination to injure the plaintiff by inducing by threats of business loss a
third person not to deal with him is actionable, if loss results to the
plaintiff. In the case under discussion the publication of the black
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list may be considered to have hurt the plaintiff firm by inducing
through fear of physical violence or social ostracism, the workmen on
the list to leave the plaintiff's employ. Or it may be considered as
an indirect method of carrying out a plan to hurt the plaintiff workmen
mentioned in the list, as it in effect contained reasons for their social
ostrucsm by the class to which they belonged, or it may be even
regarded as an invitation to many who would read to do personal
violence to the plaintiff. If any of the above possible views of the
facts are correct, except possibly if we consider the publication merely
as an argument why others should have no dealings with them, the
action of the defendants was an actionable wrong, the writing was a
mere step in the prosecution of an unlawful purpose, and under the
earlier English cases, there is no reason why it should not have been
restrained by injunction.

